We find that an exogenously imposed board composition change significantly affected financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk management in non-financial firms we find that treated firms (those affected by the requirement to have a majority independent board) reduce their financial hedging in a difference-in -difference framework. The reduction is concentrated in firms with higher conflicts of interests factors, such as a high CEO equity ownership level , which exposes CEOs to more idiosyncratic risk, or a higher occurrence of option backdating. We reject the hypothesis that newly independent boards reduce financial hedging due to a lack of knowledge. First, we find no difference in financial hedging for firms where SOX mandated the addition of a financial expert relative to those that already had such expertise. Second, shareholder value increases more during the period of time of the listing rule deliberations for treated firms that hedge prior to the treatment. We conclude that some firms hedge excessively, reducing shareholder valuepotentially to the benefit of under-diversified CEOs. Our findings also suggest that the board plays a significant monitoring role in financial risk management.
Introduction
A large literature on risk management suggests that firms should benefit from managing risks.
1 Consistent with this prediction, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find an average 5% value premium for firms hedging currency risk. However, agency problems could lead managers to make suboptimal hedging choices. For example, Tufano (1996) concludes that managerial risk preferences are important determinants of the extent of risk management in the gold mining industry. Similar evidence is shown in Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) and Graham and Rogers, (2002) for other non-financial firms. While these papers find that CEOs with more equity ownership hedge more, Kumar and Rabinovitch, (2012) also find that firms with more agency problems hedge more. Thus, while the average firm seems to benefit from hedging, it is unclear whether firms hedge optimally.
On the one hand it is possible that firms optimally design compensation and ownership of their management to induce optimal hedging, e.g., the board provides more equity ownership to managers in order to induce more hedging. On the other hand, risk management could be affected by side effects of compensation policies or remaining agency problems. Given the possible simultaneity of determining governance and risk management, we ask whether an exogenous change to the independence of the board of directors affects risk management and if such a change in risk management is value enhancing or destroying for shareholders.
We exploit the new listing rule imposed by NYSE and NASDAQ in 2003 requiring firms to have a majority of independent directors on their board. In a difference-in -difference framework similar to Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie et al (2012) we compare treated firms (those that needed to change their board) to control firms (those that already had a majority of independent directors on their board) in terms of the extent of risk management and associated value changes.
In order to measure the extent of risk management, we introduce several new proxies based on hedge accounting data and word count measures. Prior research has used notional value of hedges reported in 10-K reports (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002) as a proxy for the extent of risk management.
Unfortunately, FAS 133 introduced in 2000 does not require the reporting of notional value of hedges anymore. 2 Nevertheless, for all firms that still disclose the notional value -about one third of our sample firms -we document high correlations with our new hedging measures.
We create a first proxy of financial hedging based on hedge accounting data available on COMPUSTAT starting from 2001 that records unrealized gains and losses from financial hedging which offset variations in future cash flow. For example, a long position in a commodity forward cont ract maturing in a future period (e.g. oil) may increase in value if the underlying has increased. However, future operating expenses (e.g., fuel costs) would increase in lockstep. Hedge accounting treatment delays recognition of the gain on the commodity contract to the period in which the underlying cost is incurred, at which point they will be netted out in that period's profits. 3 An advantage of using hedge accounting numbers is that we get an estimate of the quantitative importance of hedging. A limitation with using hedge accounting information as a proxy for the extent of financial risk management is that firms may hedge but not record it as hedge accounting. 4 We create a second proxy that casts a wider net. The proxy is based on counting words related to financial hedging in 10-K statements. We use financial hedging terms from Campello et al (2011) and Graham and Rogers (2002) . In a third proxy we extend this word-list based upon reading 10-K statements of a few high profile hedging firms (e.g., Southwest Airlines) to include detailed expressions of financial hedging contracts.
Fourth and fifth, we create focused interest rate and exchange rate hedging proxies to address concerns that general hedging terms such as 'option contract' could also be used in describing compensation arrangements. The assumption of these proxies is that firms that use more of these financial hedging expressions are more actively managing risk using financial hedges. We create a last proxy by searching 10-K statements for expressions that reflect risk management organizations and functions 3 Cash-flow hedges include derivatives used to hedge exposure to expected future cash flows that are attributable to a particular risk and may relate to existing assets or liabilities as well as to forecasted transactions (FAS 133) . Thus, our proxy Compustat Item AOCIDERGL captures commodities, foreign currency exchange rate and interest rate hedges designated as cash-flow hedges. 4 For example, " fair value" hedge s -protecting against fluctuations of assets (or liabilities) that are on a company's balance sheet -may not be included in our Compustat proxy. B ased on a survey, Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2011) find that fair value accounting for hedges has significantly affected 42% of the responding firms in how they hedge. They document a reduction in option based hedging but no effect on linear contracts. Furthermore, "natural" or "economic" hedges will not be classified as hedge accounting (see Mulford and Comiskey , 2009) .
(e.g., Chief Risk Officer). While this proxy is expected to be positively correlated with the extent of risk management on average, an increase could indicate either more monitoring or more hedging.
In the difference-in -difference analysis, we find a significant reduction in the extent of financial risk management for treated firms relative to control firms.
Economically, we find that treated firms relative to control firms display a reduction in the absolute value of unrealized gains and losses (standardized by lagged book value of assets) of 21% around the time of the listing rule change. 5 We also find that the number of words related to financial hedging decreases by between 9% and 36% depending on the measure used. However, treated firms show a marginally significant increase in the number of words related to the risk management policy and functions.
Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that the board independence requirement reduces financial hedging but increases discussions about risk management policy and functions .
However, a simple explanation could be that the treated firms decided to reduce the risk in their business. Since our hedging variables do not capture exposure, it is possible that firms would need less financial hedging because they reduced risk. If that were the case, we would expect equity volatility to decrease for treated firms (relative to control firms). However, in a difference-in-difference analysis we find that total equity volatility, and in particular idiosyncratic volatility, increases for treated firms. Taken together, the se findings are consistent with the interpretation that treated firms reduce hedging, leaving more risk to be borne by equity holders. Our findings complement those of Guay (1999) and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011) , who find that the introduction of hedging reduced equity volatility. Furthermore, we directly test whether t reated firms lower the level of operating risks by studying changes in corporate policies. We find no significant treatment effects on policies like firmdiversification, leverage , cash holding or investment.
Given the reduction in financial hedging induced by the mandated board change, we ask whether this change is value enhancing or destroying for shareholders.
First, the newly majority independent board may not have the expertise to manage 5 Guay and Kothari (2003) find that among a subsample of large, non -financial firms the amount of cash flow and value hedged using financial derivatives is small. However, their estimates are based on information in 10-K statements prior to the new hedge accounting rules. It is thus possible that our finding of larger unrealized gains and l osses due to hedging might be affected by the new reporting requirements.
risk, and thus may cut back on hedging for la ck of understanding. We call this the 'knowledge hypothesis'. Alternatively, the 'monitoring hypothesis' posits that power will shift towards the independent directors on the board, who will cut back on excessive hedging that is not in the interest of shareholders.
To test the 'knowledge hypothesis' we use a second, exogenous board rule change imposed by the Sarbanes -Oxley act (SOX) -whereby firms were required to have a financial expert on the audit committee -to explore whether treated firms (with newly independent boards) which also had to add a financial expert saw any reduction in risk management. Both Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2012) and Cunat and Garicano (2010) find evidence that financial expertise at the board level mattered for risk management in financial firms, albeit with opposite effects. 6 In a difference-in -difference analysis, we find no significant difference in financial hedging among treated firms (newly independent boards) which are also obligated to add a financial expert. 7 Furthermore, we find that treated firms increase their reporting about risk management organization and functions relative to control firms.
Hence, it seems unlikely that the reduction in financial hedging is primarily the result of adding new, independent directors without sufficient knowledge to properly oversee financial hedgin g policies or operations.
To test the monitoring hypothesis, we split the treated firms (board independence shock) into two groups: those with ex-ante higher agency problems and those with lower problems. Firms with a CEO who has above sample median equity ownership are classified as 'high agency problem' firms. The reason for this somewhat unusual classification is that such CEOs have a higher exposure to the firm's idiosyncratic risk, a risk not priced in the market by diversified shareholders 6 Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2012) documented an increase in risk-taking by financially literate independent boards during the financial crisis. Studying Spanish banks, Cunat and Garicano (2010) found that a lack of financial knowledge on the board lowered the quality of the loans and their performance. While both papers investigate the link between boards, risk, and performance, neither shows a direct effect on risk management. Beyond the focus on board quality only, Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) analyze 75 U.S. bank holding companies and create a risk management ranking. They find that banks with better rankings in 2006 were less exposed to subprime-mortgage loans and performed better during the crisis. However, their paper does not show a link between board expertise and risk management ranking. 7 However, there is some evidence that firms that did not have a financial expert on the audit committee in 2002 did hedge less throughout the sample period, consistent with board skills being selected endogenously.
but to which the CEOs are nonetheless exposed. 8 We find that such firms display a significant reduction in financial hedging, consistent with the monitoring hypothesis.
This finding is consistent with Tufano (1996) and Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) that find firms with high CEO equity exposure hedge more and add that this might be evidence of suboptimal hedging.
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When we split the sample according to whether boards have received backdated option grants (following Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010) as a proxy for agency problems, we find that only backdating firms experience a reduction in hedging.
Interestingly, Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) Graham and Rodgers (2002) also find that firms where CEOs have a higher delta of equity ownership hedge more. This is in contrast to Haushalter (2000) , who did not find that equity ownership is related to hedging in the oil and gas producing industry. evidence that firms m ay not hedge optimally, especially if they face more agency problems.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, our finding that treated firms reduce financial hedging and experience an increase in firm value contributes to the understanding of whether firms hedge optimally. Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) , Graham and Rogers (2002) , and Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) , find that CEOs with more option delta in their incentive compensation hedge more. While hedging might be valuable as shown in Allayannis and Weston (2001) , it is possible that firms might over-hedge, thus reducing firm value at the margin. Our paper suggests that firms with higher powered CEO incentive contracts and more agency problems have hedged too much, potentially to be nefit the CEO at the expense of shareholders.
Second, we contribute to the discussion about the role of the board in risk management. To our knowledge , this paper is one of the first to focus on the role of the board in non-financial firms and to conclude that it plays a significant monitoring role in risk management. Our study complements research on the link between governance and risk management in financial institutions. Schmid, Sabato, and Aebi (2011) assess the role of the board in risk management, finding that if the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) reported directly to the board (as opposed to the CEO), financial institutions performed better during the financial crisis. Cunat and Garicano (2010), and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2012) show links between board expertise and performance of financial institutions during the crises, while Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) show that banks which they classify as having a 'better risk management' performed better during the crisis. Our conclusion is also i mportant in light of the 2010 SEC requirement that firms disclose more information about the role of the board in risk management , implying that the role of the board is important in this aspect even in non-financial firms.
Our study contributes to a third strand that focuses on the determinants of financial risk management in companies. The standard corporate finance literature on corporate risk management suggests why non-financial firms might want to hedge (see footnote 1). However, according to the survey by Bodner et al (2011) , these theoretical explanations do not match those given by managers about why they primarily engage in risk management. Our study adds to this literature by showing that agency problems and weak monitoring by the board may lead firms to h edge idiosyncratic risk for the benefit of the CEO. Given that we find a reduction in financial hedging and a simultaneous increase in idiosyncratic risk among the treated firms, this may partially explain why respondents in Bodner et al (2011) did not mention reducing idiosyncratic risk as one of the top three reasons for risk management -it may knowingly be suboptimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and methodology, Section 3 analyzes whether board independence affects financial hedging. In Section 4 we test whether the reduction in hedging is due to adding independent directors without financial knowledge or whether the board now monitors better. Section 5 tests whether the observed reduction in financial hedging is good or bad for shareholders using an event study, and Section 6 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Sample Selection
The first part of the paper investigates whether risk management, in particular financial hedging, is affected by the exogenously imposed change in board independence. Firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ were mandated to have a majority of independent directors. The listing rule changes were approved in November 2003 by the SEC. The listing requirement changes happened around the same time as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was put in place (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007) . To control for the simultaneous changes imposed on all firms, we use a difference-in-difference approach first used in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) . We start with all publicly listed firms from the Compustat/CRSP database and select those that also have information on IRRC about board independence. This limits our sample to 1017 firms. We further restrict the sample to non-financial firms (excluding firms with SIC 6000-6999). This leaves us with a final sample of 891 firms and 7271 firm-year observations between 1998 and 2006. Firms are classified as treated firms if they did not have a majority independent board in 2002, as defined by IRRC. 10 The remaining firms are classified as control firms, i.e., firms not explicitly affected by the listing rule change mandating majority board independence.
According to this rule , we classify 202 firms as treated and 689 firms as control firms. This is similar to Guthrie et al (2012) , who have 78% of their sample firms classified as compliant.
Methodology
To test whether risk management has changed differently between treated and control firms, we run the following difference-in-difference regression:
Risk Management it = ß 0 + ß i afterlaw t × treated dummy i + ?'X it + firmfixed (1) + FF48 × yearfixed + e it where i indexes firms and t time. The afterlaw dummy is equal to one from 2003 onwards. The treated dummy is equal to one in all sample years if the firm is affected by the NYSE/NASDQA listing requirement change. X it represents the independent variables included as controls. Firmfixed denotes the firm fixed effect. FF48 are dummies for the Fama -French 48 industries. Yearfixed is a year fixed effect. eit is the residual. Note that we do not include a treated-dummy separately as it is absorbed in the firm fixed effect. Similarly, the afterlaw dummy separately is absorbed in industry-year joint fixed effects. Following Guthrie et al (2012) we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-period level, where the period refers to the years before and after the rule change, respectively.
Hedging Variable Definitions
Here we describe the construction of the main variables of interest. Definitions of all variables used are given in When we exclude firms with zero notional value, the average notional-to-asset ratio increases to a comparable 8% (not tabulated). We then compute a time series corre lation between our new hedging measures and the net notional -to-asset ratio for each firm with available data. The median correlation between the net notional-toasset ratio and CLMZ (HPS, IRHedge, FXHedge ) are 54% (54%, 67%, 42% ). The significantly positive correlations lend further credibility to the word count measures as proxies for the extent of risk management.
The average standardized CLMZ and HPS measures are 0 .16 and 0.18 respectively. If the hedging word use was uniformly distributed between min and max within an industry-year, the average would be 0.5. These averages indicate that there are some firms in each industry with a very high count of risk management related words. However, we did check that the average s were not driven by a handful of outliers. When winsorizing the variables at the third and 97 th percentile, the average standardized measures increase only marginally to 0.17 and 0.19 respectively, indicating that there is a wide dispersion in the use of hedging within an industry.
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The number of words related to the risk management organization and functions is relatively small, representing only 0.007% of the total words in the 10-K. 42% of the firm-year observations show some description of risk management policy.
Interestingly, Bodner et al (2011) report that 44% of non-financial firms said they had a risk management policy in place.
The absolute value of cash flow hedges divided by the lagged book value of assets is 0. 15% , while the median is zero. We focus on absolute values as a proxy to capture the extent of hedging rather than the direction of hedging or the net positions.
A back of the envelop calculation shows that firms which use cash flow hedging hedge about 19% of their average profits. 14 However, we find that only 16% of the sample firm-years use cash flow hedging (D(CFHedge)). Compared to the 42% of the firms that report some risk management policy in our sample and Bodner et al's (2011) survey evidence of 44% of firms with risk management policies, it seems likely that the hedge accounting proxy underestimates the extent of financial risk management. In order to assess whether the cash flow hedge proxy is systematically biased based upon the industry, we report in panel B of Table 1 the averages for each of the 10 Fama-French industries. 15 According to the hedge accounting proxy, we find 13 We have also run all the regressions winsorizing the hedging variables at the three and 97 th percentiles. None of the inferences are affected (not tabulated). 14 On average, firms have an ROA of 5% and hedge 0.09% of assets. Thus, the average firm hedges 3.0% of its profits (0.15%/5% ROA). Among the 16% of the firms which report cash flow hedging, the average profit hedged is therefore about 18.75% (3.0%/16%). 15 Note that we use the Fama-French 48 industry classification in the regressions. However, for expositional purposes we report here the condensed industry classification.
that Oil, Gas, and Coal and Util ities (Business Equipment and Wholesale and Retail) industries are the two highest (lowest) users of financial hedging, on average. We obtain a similar ranking if we use the word count measures CLMZ and HPS expressed as a fraction of the total number of words in the 10-K statements. The two top industries are Oil, Gas, and Coal and Utility, the two bottom industries are Telecom and Healthcare (followed very closely by Business Equipment and Wholesale and Retail). While there is significant variation between industries in terms of the average hedging, the ranking is very similar across the different proxies. This reduces our concern that the cash flow hedging pr oxy is systematically biased against one particular industry. There is one interesting exception. Net notional -to-asset ratios for Oil, Gas, and Coal and Utilities are the lowest of all industries. While those industries are classified by our other measures as heavy users of financial hedging, the notional values of the hedges are smaller because the underlying is mostly commodities, not interest rates or foreign exchange rates. The latter have typically higher notional values. Note that the fact that the net notional -to-asset ratios have a different industry distribution does not affect our regression analyses since those are run at the firm level in a difference-in-difference framework with industry controls.
Panel C of Table 1 shows univariate statistics for control variables that we include in the regressions. We control for the industry concentration since Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) show that governance changes in competitive industries have less of an impact. Firm size could affect access to hedging instruments. We use the log of the book value of assets as a proxy for size. Firm age could correlate with hedging for a number of reasons. First, older firms would have had more time to do operating hedges and might thus need fewer financial hedges. Older firms could also hedge less if they are more complacent. We add Tobin's Q as a proxy for growth opportunities. Growth firms might have to trade off between investing in new projects or hedging if there are financial constraints (e.g., Rampini and Vis hwanathan, 2010).
Hedging could be affected by the performance of the firm (Rampini, Sufi, Vishwanathan, 2012). We include ROA, lagged ROA, and the stock return over the calendar year as controls.
Board Independence and Financial H edging
We address the question of whether firms hedge optimally in a difference-indifference framework where we study the changes in risk management around the 2003 NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule change , which required firms that did not yet have a majority independent board to change its board composition.
Hypotheses
In the following section, we describe what changes we expect when the board becomes independent. Our null hypothesis is that the board does not affect financial hedging. Alternatively, if the board matters, the amount of financial risk management could either go up or down at the time when the board has to become majority independent.
Under the assumption that the newly majority independent board acts in the interest of shareholders we have the following hypotheses:
H1: Risk management increases if the insider dominated board has done too little hedging. This increase is in the interest of shareholders.
H2: Risk management decreases if the insider dominated board has done too much hedging. This decrease is in the interest of shareholders.
It is also possible that the newly majority independent board does not have the necessary knowledge to hedge the company's exposure in an optimal way.
H3: Risk management increases, leading to over-hedging. This change would be suboptimal for shareholders.
H4: Risk management decreases, leading to under-hedging. This change would be suboptimal for shareholders.
3.2 Difference-in-difference E stimates 3.2.1. Main Results Table 2 shows estimates of regression (1) with the various hedging proxies. In column 1, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the hedge accounting losses
and gains recorded at the fiscal year end, standardized by lagged book value of assets.
The main variable of interest is the afterlaw * treated dummy interaction. The coefficient on the interaction term is -0. 031, significant at the 10% level . This coefficient implies that treated firms reduce the amount of unrealized gains and losses due to hedging by 21% (-0. 031/0.145) relative to the overall sample average. We find that larger firms (measured by log of assets) use more cash flow hedging, as do firms with a higher Tobin's Q, higher ROA, and a higher stock return. Older firms use less cash flow hedging.
In column 2 we use the word count measure CLMZ expressed as a fraction of the total number of words in the 10-K statements, and find a coefficient of -0.017, In column 9 we show that even using the net notional-to-asset ratio as a proxy for the extent of risk management, we find a marginally significant drop among treated firms. The coefficient of -0.014 implies that treated firms reduce their net notional values of hedging by 1.4% of the assets relative to control firms. Given the overall mean net notional-to-asset ratio of 4.9%, this is economically a sizable reduction. Note, however, that this inference applies only to firms which still report notional values of hedges. These are thus firms that hedge at least in some of the sample years. Nonetheless, it is reassuring to see that measures used in earlier studies to proxy for hedging lead to similar inferences, namely, that treated firms reduce their financial hedging relative to control firms.
All regressions so far are consistent with the interpretation that financial hedging is reduced in firms that were forced to get a majority independent board relative to the control firms. However, in column 10 where we use RISK_POLICY as the dependent variable, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the afterlaw * treated dummy interaction. Thus, while hedge accounting, the use of words related to financial hedging, and net notional-to-asset hedging decrease, the discussion of risk management policy and functions related issues has increased in treated firms.
Robustness
Inferences from the difference -in-difference methodology rely on the assumption that, absent the treatment effect, both treated and control firms would have changed the same. To assess whether this is plausible, we test whether treated and control firms followed a parallel trend prior to the treatment. We test for differences in hedging measures between treatment and control firms by running the difference-in -difference regression (1) where we replace the afterlaw dummy with year dummies. The holdout year, t, is 2002. We find that none of the pre-event variables are significant, as shown in Table 3 , panel A. This analysis suggests that the parallel trend assumption is not violated for any of the three main hedging proxies.
Furthermore, differences in hedging start to be significantly different from 2004 onwards for all proxies, and for some proxies from 2003 onwards.
We also test whether the firm characteristics we include as control variables evolve significantly differently. However, we find no significantly different trends in firm size, measured as the log of assets, Tobin's Q, ROA and ROA lagged, contemporaneous stock returns over one year, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry concentration computed at the three-digit SIC level, and firm age (not reported). Nonetheless, to test whether the inclusion of these firm level controls are 'bad controls' (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) which potentially bias the treatment coefficient dummy, we exclude all control variables, except for the fixed effects. would discuss the changes in the risk management policy in the 10-K. However, both hypotheses are formulated holding the level of risk incurred by the company constant.
Since our hedging measures are not able to control for risk exposure, it is possible that treated firms simply reduce the underlying risks, which in turn reduces the need to use financial hedges. Thus, the identified treatment effect could be spurious. In order to address this issue, we test whether the corporate policies were adjusted in a way that reduces risk and whether equity risk has changed.
Board Independence and Changes in Risks
One reason why we could find a change in financial hedging for treated versus control firms is that the treatment affects the amount of risks taken -and accordingly affects financial risk management. Thus, the question we are asking here is one of causality. Is it that financial hedging is reduced, which increases risk born by investors, or is it that business risk and financial risk are reduced, which requires less financial hedging and reduces risk born by investors?
If the reason for the observed reduction in financial hedging is that treated firms reduce business and/or financial risks, then we predict firms' corporate policies to change in the following directions: 1) Diversification should increase; 2) cash holding should increase ; 3) leverage should decrease; 4) investment, especially in more risky R&D, should decrease. To the extent that other policies could be changed (e.g., operating leverage, geographic diversification, etc.), the inferences from our tests are limited by the policies investigated.
We use the same methodology (equation 1) to test whether the board independence requirement has affected corporate policies. Variables are defined in the Appendix, univariate statistics given in Table 1 , panel D, and the regression results reported in Table 4 . We first test whether the number of segments in different fourdigit SIC industries changes , and whether the probability of being diversified (defined as having multiple segments in different four-digit SICs) has changed. Both regressions show insignificant coefficients on the afterlaw * treated dummy.
Furthermore, we find no significant treatment effect in cash, leverage , capex, and R&D. 16 Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the exogenous change in board independence does not systematically affect corporate policies which would reduce the level of business and financial risk taken by treated firms. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that the documented reduction in financial hedging is unlikely driven by a lower need for hedging since business risk and financial risk are not reduced by the treatment.
Board Independence and Equity Risk Changes
Guay (1999) finds that firms which start using financial hedging reduce their equity risk, and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011) show in a cross-country study that firms which use more financial hedging display lower equity volatility, both in the systematic as well as idiosyncratic volatility parts. Based on those prior findings, we expect that a reduction in hedging should lead to an increase in equity volatility.
Alternatively, if the reduction in hedging was because treated firms reduce their business and/or financial risks, then we would expect treated firms to display a reduction in equity volatility.
Methodology and Variable Definition
We ask whether equity volatility has changed differently for treated and control firms. In these tests we use proxies for equity volatility at the annual frequency as our dependent variables. We use the following procedures to estimate equity volatility.
First we use a time series of daily stock returns over a calendar year to estimate an annual equity volatility. To separate volatility into a systematic and an idiosyncratic risk component, we report results using a one-factor market model. As a robustness test we also report the idiosyncratic volatility estimates from a four-factor model. Our estimates for the systematic risk component are based on estimating beta using daily returns over the preceding year. We then compute the annual systematic volatility part as beta-squared times the market return variance of the year based on daily market returns. The idiosyncratic volatility is the variance of the (market) model's residuals.
All dependent variables are in log-form so that the coefficient on the afterlaw * treated dummy can be interpreted as the percentage change in the volatility.
In equation (1) we additionally include lagged volatility to account for ARCH and GARCH type behaviors (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) . In this analysis, the contemporaneous log stock return is included to control for predictable volatility changes due to recent stock return trends (e.g., Brandt and Kang, 2004) . Since the amount of firm specific information available to the market can affect the level of risk (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) we also control for the amount of information released by the board in the 10-K forms. To do this we include the log of the total number of words in the 10-K statement. Furthermore, prior research has shown that volatility changes differently after good versus bad news. Thus, we include a proxy for the tone of the information in the 10-K statement. We use the dictionary created by Loughran and Macdonald (2011) to determine whether a word is good news, bad news, or no news.
Does Equity
Volatility Change? Table 5 shows the difference-in-difference regression results. In the first column we find that total risk increases significantly for treated firms relative to control firms.
The coefficient on afterlaw * treated dummy is 0.049, significant at the 5% level, indicating that total annualized equity volatility increased by 4. 9% for treated firms relative to control firms. The regression also shows that firms with higher leverage display higher equity volatility. Under the assumption of constant firm risk, an increase in leverage is predicted to increase equity risk. Firms with higher ROA, higher lagged ROA, and higher stock returns display a lower volatility consistent with the previously documented negative correlation between returns and volatility (e.g., Brandt and Kang, 2004) . The positive and significant coefficient on lagged volatility is consistent with an ARCH type process. Firms which increase the information in the 10-K display an increase in volatility, while those which use more positive words in their 10-K have a lower volatility. Finally, larger and older firms display a lower volatility.
In column 2 (3) we report the systematic (idiosyncratic) volatility regression using the value-weighted CRSP index as the market return. We find that treated firms do not significantly change the systematic risk component compared to the control firms from before to after the listing rule change . However, idiosyncratic volatility for treated firms increases significantly as reported in column 3. The same inferences can be drawn from using the equally-weighted CRSP index as the market return, as shown in columns 4 and 5. Column 6 reports a regression using the idiosyncratic volatility from a four factor model. Consistent with the one factor model, we find that idiosyncratic risk has increased significantly for treated firms.
To the extent that diversified shareholders do not benefit from a reduction in idiosyncratic risk (at least as much as the undiversified CEO does ), the findings are consistent with the monitoring role of the newly independent board in their risk management function. H owever, hedging idiosyncratic risk could theoretically be in the interest of shareholders as long as frictions such as bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information costs are sufficiently high. Thus, in the following section we test whether the reduction in financial hedging is driven by better monitoring (H2) or by a possible lack of knowledge by the newly independent board ( H4).
Agency Problems versus Lack of Knowledge
In order to distinguish between H2 and H4, we test first whether financial expertise, as a proxy for knowledge, affects hedging activity as predicted by H4. To test H2, we ask whether firms with more agency problems prior to the exogenous shock experience a bigger drop in hedging. Then we will investigate the shareholder wealth changes around the introduction of the rule change.
Financial E xpertise
The forth hypothesis assumes that the newly independent board might lack knowledge to hedge in a value maximizing way. We investigate whether adding financial experts to the board affects financial hedging.
Methodology
Here we test whether financial experts on the board affect financial hedging.
The problem with such a test is that firms choose director characteristics 
Results
Results are shown in Table 6 . Across all the specifications shown, we find no significant changes in financial hedging for treated firms which had to add a financial expert as an independent board member. However, the board independence treatment remains significant in all specifications. Interestingly, the correlation between the two treatment effects is only about 9% suggesting that the two effects are different. Thus, even if we only include the financial expert treatment dummy, we find no significant treatment effect using all different hedging variables (not tabulated). In column 8 we report an industry-year fixed effect logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm-year had an above sample HPS measure. Since we have no firm fixed effect, we add a dummy equal to one in all sample years if the firm was treated (financial expert treatment dummy). Interestingly, the negative coefficient on the financial expert treatment dummy indicates that treated firms which were required to add a fin ancial expert, have used less financial hedging throughout the sample period. However, we find no significant coefficient on the afterlaw * financial expert treatment dummy suggesting that imposing a financial expert on the audit committee of the board has not significantly altered those firms' extent of financial hedging.
To the extent that H4 predicts a significant change in financial hedging due to director knowledge, the above analysis suggests that knowledge is not the primary driver of the observed dr op in financial hedging by firms required to get a majority independent board. However, it does not exclude that adding new independent directors, endogenously chosen to be 'without' financial expertise, causes a cut in valuable hedging activity due to a lack of knowledge. To sharpen the test, we create a triple interaction term between the afterlaw * treated dummy and the financial expert treatment dummy. The fraction of firms falling into this category is relatively small with only 4% of the firms that do not comply with both requirements. The hypothesis is that if independent directors, which need to be added, lack the knowledge and thus cut back on hedging, then the afterlaw * treated dummy should have a negative coefficient while the triple interaction with the financial expert treatment should be positive and significant. Finding that the coefficient on the triple interaction is insignificant or even negative would be consistent with the interpretation that the lack of knowledge of independent directors is unlikely to explain the reason for cutting financial hedging.
In Table 7 we find that all triple interaction terms are insignificant, some with a negative coefficient and some with a positive coefficient while the coefficients on the afterlaw * treated dummy are still negative and at least marginally significant. Note that the few observations we have in each of the interaction variables weakens this test. Nonetheless, the findings are consistent with the interpretation that the lack of knowledge of newly appointed board members is rather unlikely to explain why firms did cut their financial hedging.
The finding that adding a financial expert is not related to a change in financial risk management is somewhat unexpected given the findings in Cunat and Garicano 
Agency Problems
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the reduction in hedging is due to the monitoring by the newly majority independent board. Such a board would cut back on excessiv e hedging by management. We expect that cutbacks in financial hedging due to monitoring by the board are more likely in firms with higher agency problems.
2.1 CEO O wnership Levels
CEOs with high equity ownership in the firm are more exposed to idiosyncratic risk which affects their utility but not the utility of a diversified shareholder. Knopf, Nam, Thornton (2002) find that high CEO equity ownership is associated with more hedging. Similarly, Graham and Rogers (2002) find CEOs with a higher delta of ownership hedge more using financial derivatives. We split the sample into high versus low CEO equity ownership based on the CEOs stock ownership in his/her company in 2002 relative to the median CEO stock ownership in our sample . We use equation (1) and interact the afterlaw * treated dummy with a high and a low equity ownership dummy. Note again that the high and low equity ownership dummies are not included separately in the regression since they are subsumed in the firm fixed effect. In Table 8 we show regressions using the different hedging variables. We find the reduction in financial hedging to be concentrated among high CEO equity ownership firms, consistent with the interpretation that agency costs have led firms to hedge too much and the new, majority independent board is monitoring risk management. An F-test asking whether the two interaction coefficients are different from each other is significant in five out of the nine specifications .
A potential concern with our conclusion is based on Klein's (2002) finding that higher CEO ownership is weakly associated with higher earnings management. If such managers used hedge accounting and financial derivatives to manage earnings, our findings might indicate that an independent board cuts back on earning management rather than reducing risk management. However, such an interpretation is inconsistent with Klein (2002) and Chen, Cheng, and Wang (2011) that find no association between board independence and earnings management. In untabulated tests we replace the proxies for risk management with proxies for earnings management developed by Stubbern (2010), Jones (1991) and Kotharie et at (2005) and find no significant coefficients on either the afterlaw * treated dummy nor on the afterlaw * treated dummy * high (low) CEO ownership dummy.
Lucky Option G rants
Another way to separate firms into higher versus lower entrenchment is to split the sample by firms which have granted backdated options to board members. Firms are considered to have given board members backdated option using the lucky grant definition of Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) . A lucky option grant to an independent board member is an option grant awarded on the day with the lowest stock price of the calendar month. Bebchuk et al (2010) show that even grants to independent directors display an abnormally high frequency on the lowest stock price day of the month. We interact the afterlaw * treated dummy with a backdating dummy and a no-backdating dummy. The backdating dummy is equal to one if a firm has given a lucky grant to independent directors in any of the years between 1998 and 2002, and zero otherwise. In Table 9 we show the coefficients of these regressions.
We find that reductions in financial hedging are more likely among firms where directors did get backdated (lucky) options. Note, however, that the coefficients on the interaction variable afterlaw * treated dummy * backdate are statistically insignificant in columns 6 (IR Hedge variable) and 8 (no firm fixed effects). Again, three of the ten F-tests between the two coefficients are showing statistical significance.
The tests are consistent with H2 in that the newly independent board cut s back on financial hedging activities where more agency problems existed. These findings contribute to Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) who find that firms with higher CEO entrenchment display a higher likelihood of hedging.
2.3 Hedging N eed
Industries vary in their use of financial hedging. As we have shown in Table 1 the fraction of firms per Fama-French 10 industry classification that reports hedge accounting as of 2002 is between 4% and 26%. According to H2, we expect firms to have hedged too much due to agency problems which the board did tolerate. The newly majority independent board, however, seems to cut back on such excessive Tables 8-10 where we find that the word count related to risk policy increases marginally significantly in the subsamples classified as having higher agency problems while the change is not significant in the other subsamples.
Event Study
The evidence thus far is consistent with the interpretation that treated firms reduce financial hedging, especially if there are agency problems. Implicitly this suggests that shareholders are made better off by the governance change. However, we lack more dire ct evidence of the impact of the changes in hedging on shareholder value. Thus, to differentiate further between the two hypotheses, we study the impact of the treatment on shareholder value conditional on a firm's financial hedging.
Cutting back on hedgin g when hedging was excessive due to agency problems predicts that equity value should increase. Cutting back on optimal hedging programs due to a lack of knowledge would predict a loss in shareholder value.
We test the impact of hedging on shareholder value following the methodology of Chha ochharia and Grinstein ( . 20 We do not show results where we split the sample using net notional-to-asset as a proxy for hedging because that sample of firms does not contain non-hedgers, by construction. However, splitting the sample among those hedgers, we find that treated firms with more hedging experience a higher abnormal return, but the return differences are generally insignificant with p-values around 0.2.
In a first test, we compute the difference in the following portfolio (PF) returns This mirrors the difference -in-difference methodology. We report the average daily abnormal difference-in-difference abnormal returns in Table 11 , panel A. The standard errors and t-statistics are based on the time series variation of daily abnormal returns. For each of the four portfolios used in the difference-in-difference estimate, we estimate the abnormal return for each stock, each day as
where E(R i,t ) is based on either the market model, the Fama-French three factor model, or a Fama-French-Carhart four factor model. The parameters of the factor models are estimated using 252 days outside the event window and are held constant during the event window.
Alternatively, we compute the abnormal return based on raw portfolio returns according to equation 2. We weigh each observation by the inverse of the number of stocks in the respective portfolio. This assures that the alpha of the long-short portfolio is not affected by the risk-free rate. The intercept of these regressions provide an estimate of the average daily abnormal return and its significance. We report one, three, and four factor model results.
In panel A of Table 11 , the difference-in-difference average daily abnormal returns are all positive and most are statistically significant. We also report the event window cumulative abnormal return by multiplying the average daily abnormal return by 444. Using the market model, we find treated hedgers outperform cumulatively by 5.8% (CLMZ), 6.4% (HPS), and 3.5% (CFHedge), compared to treated non-hedgers and the difference between hedgers and non-hedgers of the control firms. 21 The pvalue of the daily abnormal returns are 0.01, 0.00, and 0.09, respectively.
Cumulative abnormal return estimates using the three-or four factor models are similar. However, the three-and four -factor model abnormal returns for the CFHedge proxy are not statistically significant anymore.
In panel B of Table 11 we show the results of the one , three-and four -factor regression results. Using the market model, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns over the event period are 5.1% (CLMZ), 4.9% (HPS), 3.8% (CFHedge), significant at the 5%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Again, using three-or fourfactor models, we find similar results, with only the abnormal returns in the three-and four-factor models being insignificant when using the CFHedge proxy.
We interpret these positive and statistically mostly significant abnormal stock returns as being inconsistent with H4. Thus, it is unlikely that the reduction in hedging is predominantly due to a lack of knowledge as such a reduction in hedging would have to be value reducing as well.
It is interesting to compare the economic magnitudes of our abnormal returns (between 2.5% and 6.4%) to the average value premium of currency hedgers estimated by Allayannis and Weston (2001) of 5%. Our findings suggest that the 5% hedging value premium might be a downward biased estimate because some hedging firms are not optimally hedging dragging down the average.
Conclusion
We provide some of the first evidence that suggests firms do not hedge optimally. Agency problems led treated firms to hedge too much, and the newly independent board, through better monitoring, reduced financial hedging which in turn increased shareholder value.
Our findings add to Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002), Graham and Rogers (2002) , and Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) by suggesting that the higher level of hedging in firms with high CEO equity exposure is potentially value reducing.
Furthermore, the inferences from our analyses support the notion behind the SEC's 2010 reporting requirement change about the role of the board in risk management.
We find that board governance significantly affects financial risk management in our setting by better monitoring and cutting back on hedges that reduce idiosyncratic risk to the benefit of CEOs, but at the expense of shareholders.
In addition, our finding that idiosyncratic volatility increases as a consequence of the listing rule changes mandating majority independent boards adds to our understanding of the determinants of volatility. Schwert (1989) shows that risk varies through time and cannot only be explained by macroeconomic shocks. Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2012) list five reasons why volatility is higher in the U.S. than in other countries. Among the reasons is the quality of corporate governance (e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 2007) . Our paper adds to this literature by using an exogenous governance shock that had a significant effect on total and idiosyncratic volatility.
Appendix 1 Variable Definitions VARIABLES DEFINITIONS
CF HEDGE/AT Absolute value of unrealized gain or loss from cash flow hedging (Variable: aocidergl) scaled by lagged total asset (item #6).
CLMZ HEDGE
Number of words from the CLMZ (Campello et al., 2011) word list (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive compensation) of the 10-K.
HPS HEDGE
Number of words from the HPS word list (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive compensation) of the 10-K.
RISK POLICY
Number of words from the Risk policy word list (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive compensation) of the 10-K.
FX HEDGE
Number of words from the foreign exchange (FX) word list (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive compensation) of the 10-K.
IR HEDGE
Number of words from the interest rate (IR) word list (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive compensation) of the 10-K.
CLMZ HEDGE STD
Number of words from the CLMZ word list (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words of a firm in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between the maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at Fama-French 48 industries level.
HPS HEDGE STD
Number of words from the HPS word list (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words of a firm in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between the maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at Fama-French 48 industries level.
FX HEDGE STD
Number of words from the foreign exchange (FX) word list (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words of a firm in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between the maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at Fama-French 48 industries level.
IR HEDGE STD
Number of words from the interest rate (IR) word list (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words of a firm in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between the maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at Fama-French 48 industries level.
NOTION/AT
Absolute values of the sum of net hedging positions in interest rate hedging, foreign currency hedging and commodity hedging, all scaled by total assets (item # 6). The net position is the difference between each firm' s long and short positions in interest rate, currency and commodity respectively. A long (short ) interest rate position is one that benefits from rising (declining) interest rates. A long (short) currency derivative position benefits from price increases (decreases) of a currency other than the U.S. dollar. A long (short) commodity position is one that benefits from rising (declining) commodity prices. 
FIN EXP TREATED
Dummy equals one if none of the audit committee members of the board of directors is classified as a fi nancial expert in 2002. A financial expert is defined as having any of the following titles in the bio disclosure in the proxy statement: "Chief Financial Officer" "CPA" "Certified Public Accountant" "Auditor" "auditor" "Comptroller" "Controller" "controller" "comptroller" "financial analyst" "Financial Analyst" "Investment Banker" "Banker" "banker" "CFA" "Certified Financial Analyst" "finance" "Finance" "CEO" "Chief Executive Officer" "chairman of the board" "Chairman of the Board". LOG FIRMAGE Log of firm age, where firm age is the number of years since the firm is first listed in the CRSP database.
LOG ASSETS Log of total asset (item #6).
TOBIN'S Q
Tobin's Q' is the market value of equity (item #25 multiplied by item # 199) plus the book value of assets (item #6) minus the sum of book value of common equity (item #60) and deferred taxes (item # 74), all divided by the book value of assets (item #6).
ROA
Log of one plus ROA, where ROA is net income (item # 172) plus extraordinary items and discontinued operation (item # 48), all divided by lagged asset (item #6).
STOCK RETURN Log of one plus fiscal year stock return.
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS
Number of different business segments from Compustat Segment database at the four-digit SIC industry level.
D(SEGMENT>1)
Dummy equal to one if a firm has more than one business segment in different four-digit SIC industries.
CASH/SALES Cash (item #1) divided by sales (item #12).
LEVERAGE Short term debt (item #34) plus long term debt (item #142) divided by total asset (item #6).
CAPEX/ASSETS Capital expenditure (item #128) scaled by total asset (item # 6).
R&D/ASSETS R&D expenditure (item # 46) scaled by total asset (item # 6).
TOTAL RISK Variance of daily stock returns over one calendar year.
MARKET RISK-VALUE
Variance of market return. For each stock each year, w e regress daily stock returns on the CRSP valueweighted market index to estimate the beta of a stock. Variance of the market return is calculated as beta squared multiplied by the variance of the value-weighted market index over a year.
IDIO RISK-VALUE
Variance of the residual from a regression of daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index.
MARKET RISK-EQUAL
Variance of market return. For each stock each year, w e regress daily stock returns on the CRSP equalweighted market index to estimate the beta of a stock. Variance of the market return is calculated as beta squared multiplied by the variance of the equal-weighted market index over a calendar year.
IDIO RISK-EQUAL
Variance of the residual from a regression of daily stock returns on the CRSP equal-weighted market index.
IDIO-CARHART
Variance of residual f rom Frama-French-Carhart four factor model . For each stock each year, we regress daily stock returns on the four-factor model and we take the variance of the residuals from the regression. 
Appendix 2 Hedging Word Lists
This appendix provides a list of hedging-related words we search in companies annual 10-K filings over our sample period. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm-and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions. Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All monetary value s are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
HPS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 3 Robustness   The sample period is from 1998 t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. Coefficients of firm-and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions are reported. Column 2 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. All the variables are defined under Appendix 1. All monetary value s are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedastic ity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively .
(1) Table 5 Board Independence and Equity Volatility
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. Coefficients of firm-and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions are reported. The dependent variable in c olumn 1 is total risk. Column 2 (3) reports the systematic (idiosyncratic) volatility regression using the value-weighted CRSP index as the market return. Column 4 (5) report s the systematic (idiosyncratic) volatility regression using the equal-weighted CRSP index as the market return. Column 6 reports idiosyncratic volatility using the Fama-French -Carhart four-factor model. 'Lagged Risk' is the lagged volatility measure of corresponding dependent variable in that column. All the other variables are defined under Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Table 6 (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) [control firm, non -hedging] ). The cumulative event period abnormal returns are based on the average daily abnormal returns multiplied by 444 days in the event window. Panel B shows the results of the one, three-and four -factor regression results where the dependent variable is the daily return of the difference-indifference portfolio return. The intercept represents the average daily abnormal return. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
